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Non-Technical Summary
In this paper, we analyze the economic impacts of environmental tax reforms designed to reach given
emission reduction targets for the German economy. We assess the scope for a triple dividend from
environmental taxation, i.e. (i) a cutback in environmentally damaging emissions (the first dividend),
(ii) efficiency gains through the reduction of the overall excess burden of the tax system (the second
dividend), and (iii) a decline in unemployment (the third dividend). As actual environmental tax
schemes involve reduced tax rates or tax exemptions for industries, we place special emphasis on the
efficiency and employment implications of emission tax differentiation between the production sector
and the household sector.
Based on simulations with a dynamic multi-sector CGE model of Germany, we find that there are no
prospects of efficiency benefits and employment gains following the revenue-neutral swap of carbon
taxes for labor taxes. With respect to tax differentiation, extreme discrimination in favor of the
industrial sector induces substantial excess costs with respect to gross efficiency as well as
employment. In this case, large and cheap emission substitution possibilities in the production sector
are given up which must be compensated by costly emission reduction in the household sector.
Our policy conclusions are twofold. First, environmental tax reforms have to be justified on the basis
of environmental benefits and cannot be considered a "no-regrets" strategy. Second, policy makers
should abstain from wide-ranging exemptions of industries to avoid larger excess costs of
environmental regulation for real income and employment.
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Abstract: This paper investigates the economic impacts of environmental tax reforms designed to
reach given emission reduction targets for the German economy. Our focus is on the efficiency and
employment implications of alternative schemes for emission tax differentiation between the
production sector and the household sector. We point out that strong tax discrimination in favor of the
production sector may cause substantial excess costs. Differences in the emission tax base and the
respective ease of emission mitigation between the production sector and the household sector are
shown to play a crucial role for explaining our results.
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11. Introduction
In order to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions several OECD countries have meanwhile
implemented some type of carbon or energy tax (OECD 2001). Nearly all tax schemes involve
reduced tax rates or tax exemptions for industries that are energy intensive and/or export-oriented. The
main motivation for this type of unequal treatment is to maintain competitiveness and sectoral
employment in these industries as compared to trading partners who do not levy similar environmental
taxes. In the same vein, concerns about adverse impacts of environmental taxes on employment
motivate the recycling features of environmental tax schemes in various OECD countries: additional
tax revenues are used to cut labor costs. Given persistently high unemployment rates in OECD
countries, such a green tax reform is hoped to yield a "double dividend" in terms of both reduced
emissions and increased employment (see e. g. Pearce 1991 or Repetto 1992). Moreover, as marginal
tax rates on labor are high relative to other taxes in most OECD countries, the swap of green taxes for
labor taxes suggests potential welfare gains from a more efficient tax system, sometimes referred to as
the third (efficiency) dividend of a green tax reform.
In this paper we investigate the scope for a triple dividend putting special emphasis on the
economic implications of emission tax differentiation between the production sector and the final
consumption sector. The key insights gained from numerical simulations with a multi-sectoral
intertemporal general equilibrium model for Germany are as follows:
 Even for relatively small emission reduction targets the hopes for a second or third dividend fail.
The reason is that environmental taxes not only introduce new distortions of their own in
intermediate or consumer goods markets but also cause market distortions similar to those of the
replaced taxes.
 Given some exogenous emission reduction target, the economic implications of tax differentiation
between the production sector and the household sector are relatively similar for a broader range
of tax ratios. We may tax households at much higher rates than the production sector - and vice
versa - without significant excess costs. However, as tax differentiation comes close to exempting
the production, substantial excess costs of the environmental regulation are induced. In this case,
large and cheap emission substitution possibilities in the production sector are given up which
must be compensated by costly emission reduction in the household sector.
 If one had to choose between full exemption of the production sector versus full exemption of the
consumption sector the latter would be much more preferable on efficiency and employment
grounds. Due to the large emission base and better substitution possibilities of the production
sector relative to the consumption sector, it is less distorting to drop emission taxes on
consumption than on production.
2Our findings contrast the results of some other studies which favor the tax exemption of the
production sector based on either theoretical analysis (Richter and Schneider 2001) or numerical
simulations (Wiegard and Ruocco 1997). The theoretical approach to the analysis of energy tax
differentiation uses the framework of optimal taxation. It is of course insightful - as done in Richter
and Schneider (2001) - to add some empirically relevant features in existing theoretical models and
analyze how this will affect previous qualitative results. However, the analytical derivation of optimal
taxes is already quite complex under very simplified assumptions. In other words, even for a very
simplistic representation of the real economy, an analytical solution may not deliver any results for a
sound economic interpretation1. A complementary approach - followed here - is the simulation
analysis of tax reforms on a numerical basis. Ruocco and Wiegard (1997) provide an earlier example
of this approach for the policy problem of energy tax differentiation but employ a "toy" model with
stylized data. The latter appears to be the major reason why they come to different conclusions. Unlike
in the real world they assume the energy (emission) consumption of the production sector to be much
lower than that of the household sector. This assumption joined with unrealistically high substitution
elasticities between energy and other goods in final consumption compared to production implies that
tax exemption of the production sector is potentially less costly than exemption of the household
sector.
There have been several other studies on the economic and environmental effects of green tax
reforms for Germany based on numerical large-scale models and real data (e.g. Conrad and Wang
1993, DIW 1994, Welsch and Hoster 1995, Böhringer et al. 1997,  Böhringer and Rutherford 1997,
Meyer et al. 1997, Welsch and Ehrenheim 2000). The evidence on employment and gross efficiency
effects is mixed, partly due to differences in the concrete tax reform scenarios considered but more so
due to differences in modeling assumptions with respect to existing tax distortions, foreign closure and
labor market imperfections.2 None of these studies address the issue of tax differentiation in a
structured way. Moreover, analyses of alternative tax policies often focus on the pure public finance
aspects of green tax reforms neglecting the fact that an appropriate comparison requires to keep not
only the level of public good provision constant but also the level of the environmental target. As
illustrated by Böhringer, Ruocco and Wiegard (2001) this has important implications for the
conclusions with respect to cost-effective tax setting.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 entails a non-technical summary of the model
used for our analysis. Section 3 lays out the policy scenarios and provides an interpretation of the
simulation results. Section 4 concludes.
                                                     
1 This should not be construed as an argument against theoretical analysis which provides the base for understanding and
explaining key economic relationships also in more complex numerical settings.
2 Böhringer et al. (1998) make a critical cross-comparison of studies linking the differences in results to differences in
underlying model assumptions.
32. Model and Parameterization
This section provides a non-technical description of the intertemporal multi-sector, multi-region
model designed for the analysis of (green) tax reforms in open economies.3 Our model combines
several features that are required for an appropriate quantitative simulation of the effects induced by
green tax reforms:
 At the sectoral level it incorporates sufficient detail on sector-specific differences in emission and
factor intensities, degrees of input substitutability and price elasticites of demand in order to trace
back the structural change in production induced by a policy shift.
 The German tax system is represented in sufficient detail to capture initial tax distortions which
might give scope for efficiency gains from tax reforms.
 The phenomenon of  persistent (equilibrium) unemployment is represented based on the
established notion of a "wage curve", which can be derived from trade union wage models as well
as from efficiency wage models (see e.g. Beißinger 1996 or Hutton and Ruocco 1999).
 Consumption and investment decisions are  based on rational expectations of  future prices
(clairvoyance). This assures that the effects of  policy interference on savings and investments are
consistently taken into account.
 Apart from a complex nesting of constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functions to capture the
technological options for emission abatement via fuel-switching and energy savings, energy
demands and energy supplies are based on actual data of physical energy flows and energy market
prices. This bottom-up calibration increases the credibility of substitution possibilities associated
with top-down CES cost and expenditure functions.
 Adjustment costs of  capital stocks  are incorporated via a putty-clay approach (Phelps 1963). This
formulation accommodates premature retirement of extant capital due to larger policy shocks.
 Capital is internationally mobile with the rates of return determined by an exogenous international
interest rate. 
2.1. Basic Model Structure
The model contains a disaggregate representation of 10 industries. To account for different
pollutant and energy intensities across energy goods, the model identifies 6 primary and secondary
energy goods: hard coal (HCO), soft coal (SCO), gas (GAS), crude oil (CRU), refined oil products
(OIL) and electricity (ELE). In addition, the model incorporates important carbon-intensive and
energy-intensive industries which are most susceptible to the effects of carbon abatement policies: iron
and steel (ORE), chemical products (CHM) and an aggregate of other energy intensive industries
(EIS). The rest of the production side is then aggregated to one sector Y. Producer goods are directly
demanded by government, investment and export. Producer goods for consumption are demanded only
                                                     
3 See Appendix for an algebraic model description.
4indirectly because the model distinguishes 13 aggregate consumption categories which are produced
by combining the outputs of the 10 industries in fixed proportions. Table 1 summarizes the
classification of industry and consumer commodities.
Production
Competitive entrepreneurs minimize the cost of production and allocate investment across sectors
in order to maximize the present value of firms. For each industry, an aggregate production function
characterizes technology through transformation possibilities on the output side (between production
for domestic and export markets) and substitution possibilities on the input side (between alternative
combinations of inputs). On the output side, production is split between goods produced for the
domestic market and goods produced for the export market subject to a constant elasticity of
transformation. On the input side, nested separable CES functions describe the technological
substitution possibilities in the domestic production between capital, labor, energy and material inputs.
At the top level, material inputs are used in fixed proportions, together with an aggregate of energy
and a value-added composite of labor and capital. The value-added composite is a CES function of
labor and capital. The energy aggregate is produced with a CES function of a primary energy
composite and electricity. The primary energy composite is then a CES composite of a coal aggregate
(within which hard and soft coal are traded off at a constant elasticity of substitution) and a liquid fuel
aggregate (within which oil and natural gas are traded off at a constant elasticity of substitution).
To reflect empirical evidence on differences between cost functions in the short run and in the
long run the description of production is based on a partial putty-clay approach, which incorporates
short run adjustment costs including the premature retirement of extant capital.4
Household Behavior
Consumers choose to allocate lifetime income across consumption in different time periods. In
each period the consumer faces the choice between current consumption (non-leisure consumption
goods and leisure) and savings (future consumption). The pure rate of time preference determines the
intertemporal allocation of consumption. We employ a separable intertemporal utility function where
the intra-period utility from consumption is based on a nested CES function over leisure and non-
leisure consumption commodities.
Factors
                                                     
4 In our baseline calculations we assume that 90 % of the initial capital operates as a fixed Leontief technology. Substitution
between various forms of energy, material, capital and labor are possible only for 10% of the capital stock in the initial
period. Subsequent replacement of new capital results in an increasing elasticity of substitution between primary factors over
time.
5Primary factors of production are labor, sector-specific (extant) capital and capital which is freely
mobile across sectors and domestic boundaries. Labor supply is elastic and inter-sectorally mobile
within the home country. Total labor endowment increases with labor force efficiency along a steady-
state growth rate of 1%. Capital stocks evolve through geometric depreciation and new investment. In
the small open economy framework, the rates of return on mobile capital are determined by the
international interest rate. With respect to capital we assume perfectly competitive factor markets in
which factor prices adjust so that supply equals demand. Labor markets are treated as imperfectly
competitive resulting in persistent unemployment. The latter is introduced through the specification of
a wage curve, which postulates a negative relationship between the real wage rate and the rate of
unemployment (see e.g. Böhringer, Ruocco, and Wiegard,  2001). The wage curve replaces the labor
supply curve leading to an equilibrium wage rate above the market clearing wage rate, i.e.
unemployment. We use a simple standard specification of the wage curve as a log-linear relationship
between the real wage and the unemployment rate (which initially amounts to 10%). Unemployment
benefits are assumed to be constant in real terms and are not taxed (see Koskela and Schöb, 1999, for a
discussion of alternative forms of unemployment benefits). Welfare effects are also based on enforced
leisure consumption.
Government Sector
The government distributes transfers and provides a public good (including public investment),
which is produced with commodities purchased at market prices. Government expenditures are
financed with tax revenues. The model incorporates the main features of the German tax and social
transfer system: labor taxes including social insurance contributions, capital taxes (corporate and trade
taxes), value-added taxes and other indirect taxes (e.g. mineral oil tax). In our tax policy simulations,
we impose revenue-neutrality in the sense that the provision of the public good is kept constant. Any
residual tax revenue is recycled lump-sum or through a reduction in existing taxes. Constant public
good provision and separability between private and public good consumption simplifies the analysis
of welfare effects induced by alternative tax reforms because we do not have to trade off welfare
effects due to changes in public good provision.
The public budget is balanced on an intertemporal basis. Along the baseline growth path,
public income and expenditures balance on a period-by-period basis.5
Investment and Savings
The level of savings is endogenously determined by households which maximize lifetime
consumption over the time horizon. Firm owners choose investment in order to maximize the present
                                                     
5 In the counterfactual scenarios, the application of environmental taxes might result in a temporary public deficit, as the
anticipation of future tax revenue permits public expenditure to exceed government income during the initial periods. In all
simulations the present value of public expenditure equals the present value of tax revenues.
6value of the firm. In the simulations, new investment is assumed to have a 3 year gestation. Investors
and households compete for current consumption such that in equilibrium the marginal utilities of
savings (future consumption) and demand (current consumption) are equalized.
Foreign Trade
Following the proposition of Armington (1969), domestic and foreign goods are distinguished by
origin. This accommodates both imports and exports of the same commodity (crosshauling). Due to
lack of more detailed data, domestic and imported varieties of the same good are aggregated with
identical shares across all components of final and intermediate demand. Demand for imports stems
from cost-minimizing producer behavior and utility maximization of households. On the export side,
products destined for domestic and international markets are treated as imperfect substitutes
(produced) subject to a constant elasticity of transformation. Germany is treated as small relative to the
world market. The small country assumption implies that changes in the level of German exports and
imports have no effect on the terms of trade - international prices are exogenously fixed in foreign
currency, i.e. export demand and import supply functions are horizontal. International capital flows
(borrowing and lending) are endogenous subject to an intertemporal balance of payments constraint,
i.e. there is no change in net indebtedness over the model horizon. The imposition of an
intertemporally balanced trade account is linked to a variable exchange rate which reconciles the
present value of domestic import and foreign export demands.
2.2. Model Parameterization
As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, the model is based on economic
transactions in a benchmark year, 1995 in our case. Benchmark data determines parameters of the
functional forms from a given set of benchmark quantities, prices (expressed in present value), and
elasticities. Data stem from the Statistical Federal Office of Germany which provides monetary input-
output tables for 58 sectors as well as detailed information on physical energy flows to production
sectors and final demand categories (StaBu 1996). We replace the aggregate input-output monetary
values for energy supply and demand with physical energy flows supplemented by official energy
prices for industry and households. This bottom-up calibration of energy demands and supplies yields
sector-specific and energy-specific emission coefficients. The advantage is that marginal abatement
cost curves and hence the cost evaluation of emission constraints are based on actual energy flows
rather than aggregate monetary data, which strengthens the credibility of the quantitative results. Data
on various tax payments and transfers are taken from the Statistical Yearbook (StaBu 1997).
Base year financial statistics indicate the value of payments to capital across sectors and the gross
value of capital formation. Using this data, we infer three parameters of the intertemporal model in
order to assure consistency with a balanced steady-state growth path. These parameters are the rate of
time preference, the depreciation rate of capital, and the growth rate of labor in efficiency units.
Assuming an exogenous labor growth rate of 1%, base year capital earnings and investment are
7consistent with a time preference rate (interest rate) of 4.6% and a capital depreciation rate of 6.3%.
Table 2 summarizes key elasticities.
3. Scenarios and Results
3.1. Scenarios
Within the Kyoto Protocol (UN 1997), Germany has committed itself to reduce its greenhouse gas
emissions, most notably carbon emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels. In our policy
simulations, we apply endogenous carbon taxes which are sufficiently high to effect a linear reduction
of carbon emissions till 2010 and thereafter by 5% (scenario R05), 10% (scenario R10) and 20%
(scenario R20) as compared to the respective business-as-usual values.6 The use of fixed reduction
targets provides a meaningful basis for the cross-comparison of alternative carbon tax differentiation
schemes. As to the differentiation of carbon taxes between the production and household sector, we
consider various schemes between the two extremes of fully exempting the production as well as the
household sector. We implement tax differentiation as the ratio between the emission tax on the
household sector and the emission tax on the production sector. A tax ratio of 10, for example,
indicates that the emission tax paid by households is ten times higher than that paid by the industry.
Note that we can only specify the ratio of tax differentiation exogenously. The associated absolute tax
rates are determined endogenously subject to the constraint that the exogenous emission reduction
target will be met. With respect to the compensating adjustments in other taxes, we restrict ourselves
to cuts in labor taxes which - for reasons of unemployment - are the primary candidate considered in
actual policy making.7
3.2. Economic Intuition
Before we enter interpretation of the concrete simulation results, let us develop the basic economic
intuition on our tax policy problem. In simple formal terms, we are challenged to solve a joint
environment-public goods optimal tax problem over some set of available tax instruments tk:
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6 Carbon taxes apply to domestically produced fossil energy goods as well as to fossil energy imports, but they do not apply
to embodied carbon in imported goods. Similarly, carbon taxes do not apply to exports of any kind, and there are no rebates
of carbon taxes paid on inputs to exported goods.
7 The revenue-neutral tax cuts on labor apply to all periods at the same constant rate.
8where:
W is a welfare function,
E is the level of pollution,
G is the level of public good,
G is the lower bound for public good supply, and
E is the upper bound on permissible emissions.
The first order condition for tk is then:
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where:
E is the shadow price on the environmental constraint, and
G is the shadow price on the public goods constraint.
In the standard public finance setting  - if the environmental constraint were non-binding, so
0E  - we obtain the usual optimality condition dictating equalization of the marginal costs of
public funds (MCF) for all instruments:
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This could be used in a numerical model setup for a simple recursive procedure to adjust the tax
rates to their optimal values by increasing those taxes with a low MCF and decreasing those which
have a high MCF.
Alternatively, we could omit the public goods constraint, so 0E , and focus on the
environmental constraint which would yield the well-known Pigouvian tax as a non-discriminating
uniform tax across all polluting sources. Reverting to our initial question of environmental tax
differentiation, Figure 1 sketches the determinants of excess costs imposed by the deviation from
uniform taxation. Given some overall emission reduction target, the optimal contribution of two
different sectors - say industry on the one hand and households on the other hand - is given by the
intersection of the respective marginal abatement costs. If we distort the optimal allocation of
reduction contributions across sectors, the induced efficiency losses do not only depend on the
magnitude but also on the direction of shifted emissions. In other words, the costs of differentiating
taxes depend on the ratio of tax rates and the choice of sector to be favored or discriminated. In the
simulation results below, we will see that the inferior emission substitution possibilities within the
9household sector as compared to the industrial sector8 is the main reason why strong tax differentiation
in favor of the industrial sector induces relatively high welfare and employment losses.
The preceding considerations have only focused on one constraint of the joint environment-public
goods optimal tax problem. In the real world, which we try to mimic with our simulations, both
constraints are binding and we must take into account the environmental impact as well as the impact
of the public good provision. In this case, the MCFs do no longer provide sufficient information and it
is not so easy to implement an iterative algorithm for finding the optimal tax structure. In our
numerical calculations, we simply "brute force" the optimal solution by picking sufficiently small
steps for tax differentiation.
3.3. Results
Following the traditional design of policy evaluation in general equilibrium analysis, the scenario
evaluation is based on the comparison of alternative equilibria: the impacts of tax policy changes are
reported with reference to a steady-state growth path, in which the baseline policy is maintained. Thus,
all departures from the steady state can be attributed to the alternative policy. Our focus is on the long-
run equilibrium efficiency and employment implications induced by alternative tax differentiation
schemes. Hence, we do not discuss the adjustment paths of economic indicators towards the new
steady-state but restrict our representation of results to the new steady-state equilibrium values.
Tables 3 to 5 summarize the impacts of the green tax reform on gross efficiency and
unemployment rates for different exogenous reduction targets (R05, R10, R20) and a large number of
tax differentiation schemes (for a graphical representation of these results see Figures 2-4).
The more general finding is that hopes for a second and a third dividend do not materialize. As
emission taxes have a small tax base compared to labor taxes the revenue-neutral swap of the former
for the latter increases the excess burden of the tax system. Carbon taxes decrease the use of fossil
fuels in production and lower the marginal productivity of labor. This downward pressure on the real
wage is (even) not offset for the case of revenue-neutral adjustments of the labor tax. The fall in the
real wage is associated with an increase in unemployment. Furthermore, we can observe that a move
towards higher reduction targets gets increasingly more expensive. The higher the reduction target the
further out is the economy on its marginal abatement cost function where additional units of energy
savings or fuel switching get more difficult, i.e. more costly. The overproportional increase in
marginal abatement costs is reflected in a corresponding rise of the inframarginal costs.
Our key insights refer to the implications of alternative tax differentiation schemes. First of all, our
results highlight the importance of existing tax distortions for the cost-effective differentiation of
carbon taxes. From a theoretical point of view the result is obvious if in addition to the carbon taxes,
which aim at the achievement of the carbon reduction target, first best (non-distortionary) taxes or
                                                     
8 Graphically speaking the marginal abatement cost curve of the household sector exhibits a stronger curvature.
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transfers, are available in order to finance the public good or to refund carbon taxes to private
households. In that case, energy consumption of the private and business sector should be taxed with
equal rates (Pigouvian tax). Obviously, the existing German tax system is not first-best. One must
,therefore, account for the effects of carbon taxes on the public policy objective of minimizing the
excess burden of the available tax instruments. However, it is not possible to derive an analytical
formula for our rather complex representation of the real economy which explicitly captures the trade-
off between the environmental objective and the public policy objective. Our numerical results suggest
that towards higher environmental targets the range for tax differentiation, which restricts excess costs
as compared to the optimal carbon tax levels, shrinks. The economic explanation is that with stricter
reduction guidelines the environmental objective dominates the public policy objective which implies
rather equalization than differentiation of carbon emission taxes.
Let us consider the economic implications of tax differentiation in more detail. Starting with the
extreme case of tax exemptions, we can see that full exemption of the production sector causes large
excess costs of reaching some given environmental target. These excess costs increase drastically with
the level of emission reduction. The large additional costs of exempting the productive use of
emissions stem from foregone emission substitution possibilities in this sector: the production sector
accounts for nearly 75% of total business-as-usual emissions and - ceteris paribus - has cheaper
substitution possibilities (e.g. shifts from coal to gas in power production) compared to the final
consumption sector. When we exempt the production sector, large emission taxes must be levied on
households to comply with given reduction targets. From the point of view of cost-effectiveness, the
contribution of the household sector to the overall reduction target is then much too high whereas the
production sector, which is only indirectly affected through declining demand for goods, contributes
by far too little. This result clearly contradicts suggestions for tax exemptions of intermediate emission
use (see Ruocco and Wiegard 1997). In fact, we draw the opposite conclusion: looking at the other end
of tax differentiation options, we find that full exemption of the household sector will cause only very
small additional costs compared to the full exemption of the industry. While this scenario seems not
particularly realistic given the relative small lobbying power of consumers it nevertheless bears
important policy implications. Considering the strongly inferior efficiency properties of production
exemptions compared to household exemptions, policy makers or industrial lobbyist will find it hard
to push for the former.
Why would full exemption of the household sector hardly matter with respect to the efficiency and
employment effects of targeted tax reforms? The emission base of the household sector is relatively
small and substitution possibilities are rather expensive. Therefore, at economy-wide scale, the
exemption of households causes a relatively small deviation of the resource allocation from the
optimal adjustment pattern. The relative importance of taxes on industry as compared to taxes on
households based on their uneven emission shares is reflected in the associated carbon tax rates. In real
terms, an exclusive carbon tax on industrial emission use is only slightly higher compared to some
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optimal level, whereas an exclusive carbon tax on household emission use amounts to a multiple of its
optimal level.
We then turn to the issue of tax differentiation when the option of full exemption of either the
production or the household sector is excluded. We see that tax differentiation within a broader scale
has only negligible implications with respect to efficiency and gross employment. Even for very small
tax ratios, i.e. very low emission taxes on the consumptive use of energy compared to the intermediate
(industrial) use, the excess costs are limited. Although the real carbon tax rates for households fall
sharply beyond their optimal levels, the small emission base of households assures that the
compensating rise in the industrial carbon tax, which applies to a much larger base, is rather small and
so are the induced deviations from the optimal adjustment to the exogenous emission reduction target.
Excess costs of tax differentiation in favor of the industrial sector remain modest as long as they do
not enforce a substantial deviation of the industrial carbon tax from its optimal level. In our
simulations, this is still the case for tax ratios between 2 and 5: Due to the small emission base of the
household sector the household carbon tax must rise steeply to offset additional emissions by the
industrial sector. As a consequence, the absolute level of the industrial tax remains close to its optimal
level even for tax ratios which are significantly beyond 2 (see also Figure 5). However, when the tax
ratio is high enough to imply a substantial drop in the absolute level of the industrial carbon tax, tax
differentiation in favor or the industry sector will cause significant excess costs. Unfortunately, current
tax differentiation schemes reflect the latter constellation as they foresee effective tax rates for
(energy-intensive) industries which are close to zero. We then find ourselves at the very bottom of
Tables 1-3 with substantial additional costs due to the preferential treatment of industries.
4. Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed the economic impacts of environmental tax reforms designed to reach given
emission reduction targets for the German economy. Our focus has been on the efficiency and
employment implications of emission tax differentiation between the production sector and the
household sector. Independent of the concrete differentiation scheme adopted our results indicate that -
even for relatively low emission reduction targets - there are no prospects of efficiency gains and
employment benefits due to a revenue-neutral swap of carbon taxes for labor taxes. As we measure the
economic costs of green tax reforms abstracting from environmental benefits, this result can not be
construed as an argument against environmental taxation. However, we may conclude that
environmental tax reforms have to be justified on the basis of environmental benefits and cannot be
considered a "no-regrets" strategy.
With regard to tax differentiation between the production and household sector, differences in the
emission tax base and the respective ease of substitution play a crucial role. Under gross efficiency and
employment considerations policy makers should abstain from full exemption of industries as this
causes costly deviations from a cost-efficient reduction strategy: the emission base in the production
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sector as well as carbon substitution possibilities are relatively high so that tax exemption foregoes
cheap emission abatement in the production sector at the expense of considerably more costly
additional abatement in the household sector. In comparison, full exemption of households induces
much smaller excess costs due to the relative small emission tax base and lower substitution
possibilities. There is a relatively large scope for tax differentiation between the industry sector and
the household sector implying only small distortions with respect to the optimal contributions of both
sectors to the overall reduction target. However, actual tax designs such as the current German
environmental tax reform include extreme tax differentiation in favor of the (energy-intensive)
industries which will cause substantial excess costs.
In our analysis we have not addressed the problem of carbon leakage. Unilateral carbon taxes may
increase emissions by non-abating countries due to induced shifts in comparative advantage (Felder
and Rutherford 1993). This might justify tax reductions for energy and trade-intensive sectors on
global efficiency grounds (Hoel 1996). However, numerical analysis suggests that leakage rates are
only of second-order magnitude when we employ empirical estimates for substitution elasticities of
traded goods belonging to the same category (see e.g. Böhringer 1998).
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Table 1: Overview of producer goods and consumption categories
SIO* Classification of producer goods Shortcut SIO* Classification of consumer categories
3 Electric power, steam and hotwater ELE 1 Food and beverages
4 Gas GAS 2 Tobacco
6** Hard coal and hard coal products HCO 3 Clothing
6** Soft coal SCO 4 Shoes
8 Crude oil CRU 5 Rents
9 Chemical products CHM 6 Energy (without fuel for traffic)
10 Oil products OIL 7 Household goods
16 Iron ore and steel ORE 8 Health products
1,2,7,11-15, 17-20,28
32,33 Other energy-intensive products EIS 9 Body care
5,21-31,34, 42-58 Rest of  industry ROI 10 Traffic (including fuels for traffic)
11 Telecommunication
12 Education
13 Other expenses
* Classification according to SIO (System of Production Sectors for Input-Output-Computations)
** Additional sectors: hard coal and soft coal are subsectors of the aggregate coal sector (SIO: 6)
Table 2: Key elasticities underlying the core simulations
Index Description Value
 KLEM Elasticity of substitution between the material inputs and the composite of
capital, labor and energy inputs 0

KLE
Elasticity of substitution between energy inputs and value-added 0.5

KL Elasticity of substitution between labor and capital 1

ELE Elasticity of substitution between electricity and the non-electric energy
aggregate of sectoral production 0.3

COA_LQD Elasticity of substitution between the coal aggregate and the liquid fuel
aggregate of sectoral production 0.5

LQD Elasticity of substitution between liquid fossil fuels in the liquid fuel aggregate
of sectoral production 2

COA Elasticity of substitution between hard and soft coal inputs in the coal aggregate
of sectoral production 4

Z Elasticity of substitution between different demand categories in intra-period
consumption 1

DM Elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and imports (Armington) 4

DX Elasticity of transformation between domestic goods and exports 4

LS Uncompensated labor supply elasticity 0.15

L Intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption 0.5
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Table 3: Economic effects of tax differentiation for 5% reduction target (R05)
Tax Ratio1 HEV2 UR3 WAGE4 CTAX_H5 CTAX_I6 CO2_H7 CO2_I8
0.00 -0.0954 0.1006 -0.17 0.00 5.79 0.04 0.96
0.05 -0.0954 0.1006 -0.17 0.29 5.77 0.04 0.96
0.10 -0.0954 0.1006 -0.17 0.58 5.76 0.04 0.96
0.20 -0.0955 0.1006 -0.17 1.15 5.73 0.04 0.96
0.30 -0.0956 0.1006 -0.17 1.71 5.69 0.05 0.95
0.40 -0.0956 0.1006 -0.17 2.27 5.66 0.05 0.95
0.50 -0.0957 0.1006 -0.18 2.82 5.63 0.05 0.95
0.60 -0.0958 0.1006 -0.18 3.36 5.60 0.06 0.94
0.70 -0.0959 0.1006 -0.18 3.90 5.58 0.06 0.94
0.80 -0.0959 0.1006 -0.18 4.44 5.55 0.06 0.94
0.90 -0.096 0.1006 -0.18 4.97 5.52 0.07 0.93
1.00 -0.0961 0.1006 -0.18 5.49 5.49 0.07 0.93
1.10 -0.0962 0.1006 -0.18 6.01 5.46 0.07 0.93
1.20 -0.0963 0.1006 -0.18 6.52 5.43 0.07 0.93
1.30 -0.0964 0.1006 -0.18 7.03 5.41 0.08 0.92
1.40 -0.0965 0.1006 -0.18 7.53 5.38 0.08 0.92
1.50 -0.0966 0.1006 -0.19 8.03 5.35 0.08 0.92
1.60 -0.0967 0.1006 -0.19 8.52 5.33 0.09 0.91
1.70 -0.0968 0.1006 -0.19 9.01 5.30 0.09 0.91
1.80 -0.0969 0.1006 -0.19 9.50 5.28 0.09 0.91
1.90 -0.097 0.1006 -0.19 9.98 5.25 0.09 0.91
2.00 -0.0971 0.1006 -0.19 10.45 5.23 0.1 0.9
5.00 -0.1008 0.1007 -0.22 22.92 4.58 0.16 0.84
10.00 -0.1075 0.1009 -0.26 38.31 3.83 0.23 0.77
20.00 -0.1193 0.1011 -0.32 58.30 2.92 0.3 0.7
100.00 -0.1573 0.1017 -0.5 104.35 1.04 0.46 0.54
 -0.1876 0.1021 -0.62 133.65 0.00 0.54 0.46
Keys:
1Tax ratio: Ratio between the emission tax on the household sector and the emission tax on the production sector (0:= tax
exemption of the household sector, := tax exemption of the production sector)
2HEV: Hicksian equivalent variation in lifetime income ( % change from BaU)
3UR: Unemployment rate (BaU level is 0.1)
4WAGE: Real wage ( % change from BaU)
5CTAX_H: Carbon tax on household sector (DM95/t CO2)
6CTAX_I: Carbon tax on production sector (DM95/t CO2)
7CO2_H: Contribution of household emission cutbacks to overall emission reduction
8CO2_I: Contribution of industry emission cutbacks to overall emission reduction
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Table 4: Economic effects of tax differentiation for 10% reduction target  (R10)
Tax Ratio1 HEV2 UR3 WAGE4 CTAX_H5 CTAX_I6 CO2_H7 CO2_I8
0 -0.2389 0.1014 -0.41 0 14.8249 0.05 0.95
0.05 -0.2387 0.1014 -0.41 0.7382 14.7635 0.05 0.95
0.10 -0.2385 0.1014 -0.42 1.4703 14.7028 0.05 0.95
0.20 -0.2381 0.1014 -0.42 2.9167 14.5833 0.06 0.94
0.30 -0.2378 0.1014 -0.42 4.3399 14.4664 0.06 0.94
0.40 -0.2375 0.1014 -0.42 5.7408 14.3519 0.07 0.93
0.50 -0.2373 0.1014 -0.42 7.1199 14.2398 0.07 0.93
0.60 -0.2371 0.1014 -0.42 8.478 14.1301 0.07 0.93
0.70 -0.2369 0.1014 -0.43 9.8158 14.0225 0.08 0.92
0.80 -0.2368 0.1014 -0.43 11.1337 13.9171 0.08 0.92
0.90 -0.2367 0.1014 -0.43 12.4324 13.8137 0.08 0.92
1.00 -0.2366 0.1015 -0.43 13.7124 13.7124 0.09 0.91
1.10 -0.2366 0.1015 -0.43 14.9743 13.613 0.09 0.91
1.20 -0.2366 0.1015 -0.44 16.2186 13.5155 0.09 0.91
1.30 -0.2366 0.1015 -0.44 17.4457 13.4198 0.1 0.9
1.40 -0.2366 0.1015 -0.44 18.6561 13.3258 0.1 0.9
1.50 -0.2366 0.1015 -0.44 19.8503 13.2336 0.1 0.9
1.60 -0.2367 0.1015 -0.44 21.0287 13.143 0.11 0.89
1.70 -0.2368 0.1015 -0.45 22.1917 13.054 0.11 0.89
1.80 -0.2369 0.1015 -0.45 23.3397 12.9665 0.11 0.89
1.90 -0.237 0.1015 -0.45 24.4731 12.8806 0.12 0.88
2.00 -0.2371 0.1015 -0.45 25.5922 12.7961 0.12 0.88
5.00 -0.2458 0.1017 -0.52 53.9071 10.7814 0.18 0.82
10.00 -0.2668 0.1021 -0.61 87.001 8.7001 0.25 0.75
20.00 -0.3066 0.1026 -0.76 128.69 6.4345 0.32 0.68
100.00 -0.4451 0.104 -1.18 227.1615 2.2716 0.46 0.54
 -0.5721 0.1053 -1.54 298.356 0 0.54 0.46
Keys:
1Tax ratio: Ratio between the emission tax on the household sector and the emission tax on the production sector (0:= tax
exemption of the household sector, := tax exemption of the production sector)
2HEV: Hicksian equivalent variation in lifetime income ( % change from BaU)
3UR: Unemployment rate (BaU level is 0.1)
4WAGE: Real wage ( % change from BaU)
5CTAX_H: Carbon tax on household sector (DM95/t CO2)
6CTAX_I: Carbon tax on production sector (DM95/t CO2)
7CO2_H: Contribution of household emission cutbacks to overall emission reduction
8CO2_I: Contribution of industry emission cutbacks to overall emission reduction
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Table 5: Economic effects of tax differentiation for 20% reduction target  (R20)
Tax Ratio1 HEV2 UR3 WAGE4 CTAX_H5 CTAX_I6 CO2_H7 CO2_I8
0.00 -0.7674 0.1044 -1.28 0 53.5632 0.08 0.92
0.05 -0.7639 0.1044 -1.28 2.6532 53.0636 0.08 0.92
0.10 -0.7606 0.1044 -1.28 5.2577 52.5768 0.08 0.92
0.20 -0.7547 0.1044 -1.28 10.3279 51.6395 0.09 0.91
0.30 -0.7496 0.1044 -1.28 15.2242 50.7472 0.1 0.9
0.40 -0.7451 0.1044 -1.28 19.959 49.8975 0.1 0.9
0.50 -0.7417 0.1044 -1.28 24.5456 49.0912 0.11 0.89
0.60 -0.7387 0.1044 -1.28 28.9923 48.3205 0.11 0.89
0.70 -0.736 0.1044 -1.29 33.3061 47.5801 0.12 0.88
0.80 -0.7334 0.1044 -1.29 37.4935 46.8669 0.12 0.88
0.90 -0.7311 0.1044 -1.29 41.5641 46.1823 0.13 0.87
1.00 -0.7292 0.1044 -1.3 45.5245 45.5245 0.13 0.87
1.10 -0.7275 0.1045 -1.3 49.381 44.8918 0.14 0.86
1.20 -0.7261 0.1045 -1.3 53.1391 44.2826 0.14 0.86
1.30 -0.725 0.1045 -1.31 56.8041 43.6954 0.15 0.85
1.40 -0.724 0.1045 -1.31 60.3806 43.129 0.15 0.85
1.50 -0.7233 0.1045 -1.32 63.8731 42.5821 0.15 0.85
1.60 -0.7227 0.1045 -1.32 67.2857 42.0535 0.16 0.84
1.70 -0.7223 0.1045 -1.32 70.6221 41.5424 0.16 0.84
1.80 -0.7221 0.1046 -1.33 73.8859 41.0477 0.16 0.84
1.90 -0.722 0.1046 -1.33 77.0804 40.5686 0.17 0.83
2.00 -0.722 0.1046 -1.34 80.2085 40.1043 0.17 0.83
5.00 -0.7538 0.1052 -1.5 152.8768 30.5754 0.23 0.77
10.00 -0.8404 0.106 -1.75 229.1577 22.9158 0.29 0.71
20.00 -0.9993 0.1074 -2.12 319.5172 15.9759 0.35 0.65
100.00 -1.5451 0.1118 -3.29 542.2482 5.4225 0.46 0.54
 -2.1721 0.1168 -4.55 746.2324 0 0.54 0.46
Keys:
1Tax ratio: Ratio between the emission tax on the household sector and the emission tax on the production sector (0:= tax
exemption of the household sector, := tax exemption of the production sector)
2HEV: Hicksian equivalent variation in lifetime income ( % change from BaU)
3UR: Unemployment rate (BaU level is 0.1)
4WAGE: Real wage ( % change from BaU)
5CTAX_H: Carbon tax on household sector (DM95/t CO2)
6CTAX_I: Carbon tax on production sector (DM95/t CO2)
7CO2_H: Contribution of household emission cutbacks to overall emission reduction
8CO2_I: Contribution of industry emission cutbacks to overall emission reduction
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Figure 1: Welfare implications (% change of Hicksian equivalent variation (HEV) in lifetime income as compared to BaU) and implied carbon taxes rates for
alternative tax differentiation ratios and scenario R20
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Figure 2: Efficiency implications (HEV in lifetime income -  %-change from BAU)
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Figure 3: Employment effects (UR - unemployment rate)
0.100
0.105
0.110
0.115
0.120
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
5
0
.
1
0
0
.
2
0
0
.
3
0
0
.
4
0
0
.
5
0
0
.
6
0
0
.
7
0
0
.
8
0
0
.
9
0
1
.
0
0
1
.
1
0
1
.
2
0
1
.
3
0
1
.
4
0
1
.
5
0
1
.
6
0
1
.
7
0
1
.
8
0
1
.
9
0
2
.
0
0
5
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
2
0
.
0
0
1
0
0
.
0
0
I
N
F
R20 R10 R05
Tax Ratio k
UR
22
Figure 4: Percentage contribution of production sector to exogenous emission cutback
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Figure 5: Welfare implications (% change of Hicksian equivalent variation (HEV) in lifetime income as compared to BaU) and implied carbon taxes rates for
alternative tax differentiation ratios and scenario R20
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Appendix: Algebraic Model Description
A.  Summary of the Generic Model
This section provides an algebraic summary of the equilibrium conditions for an intertemporal
small open economy model designed to investigate the economic implications of an environmental tax
reform. For the generic model with full employment (see section B for the specification of
unemployment) the following basic assumptions apply:
(i) Commodity prices and factor prices are fully flexible within competitive markets.
(ii) Labor is intersectorally mobile but not mobile at the international level.
(iii) Capital is freely mobile across sectors and domestic boundaries.9
(iv) Labor force productivity (efficiency) increases at an exogenous growth rate.
(v) Capital stocks evolve through constant geometric depreciation and new investment.
(vi) The level of investment in a given period is determined by competitive and individually
rational entrepreneurs who allocate investment across sectors in order to maximize the present
value of firms. Investors have no money illusion and issues such as debt-versus equity-
financing are not considered.
(vii) (viii) The public budget is balanced on an intertemporal basis.
(viii) In international trade the domestic economy is considered as sufficiently small. Therefore the
effects of exports and imports on international prices can be ignored.1011 Within this small
open economy framework, the model adopts the Armington assumption to differentiate
between domestically produced commodities and foreign produced commodities in exports
and imports. International capital flows (borrowing and lending) are endogenous, subject to an
intertemporal balance of payments constraint, i.e. no change in net indebtedness over the
model horizon.
(ix) Aggregate consumption and savings are derived from utility maximization of a representative
household. To approximate an infinite horizon equilibrium with a finite model we assume that
                                                     
9 The model version used for our simulations incorporates capital adjustment costs: We assume that 90% of the initial capital
operates as a fixed-coefficient Leontief technology. Substitution possibilities between various forms of energy, labor, capital
and material are possible only for 10% of the initial capital stock and new investment. This (partial) putty-clay formulation
has the virtue of reflecting empirical evidence between lower short-run and higher long-run elasticities of input demands and
accommodates premature retirement of extant capital.
10 Foreign export demand and import supply functions are horizontal and ,hence, can be omitted within the algebraic model
formulation.
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the representative consumer purchases capital in the post-horizon period at a price which is
consistent with steady-state equilibrium growth (terminal condition).
The model is formulated as a system of nonlinear inequalities. These inequalities correspond to
three classes of equilibrium conditions: zero profit, market clearance, and income balance. The
fundamental unknowns of the system are three vectors: activity levels, prices, and income levels. In
equilibrium, each of these variables is linked to one inequality condition: an activity level to a zero-
profit condition, a commodity price to a market-clearance condition, and a income variable to an
income-definition equation.
In the following algebraic exposition, the notation Xi  is used to denote the profit function of
sector i, where X is the name assigned to this activity. Formally, all production sectors exhibit constant
returns to scale (CRTS), hence differentiating Xi  with respect to input and output prices provides
compensated demand and supply coefficients, which appear subsequently in the market-clearance
conditions.12 All prices are expressed as present values reflecting the assumed international interest
rate and consumer's intertemporal preferences, i.e. the pure rate of time preference. In order to
simplify the notation, time indices are omitted from those equations which are strictly intra-period.
Zero profit conditions
Production
In domestic production, nested, separable, constant elasticity of substitution (CES) cost functions
are employed to specify the substitution possibilities between inputs of capital (K), labor (L), an
energy composite (E) and a material composite (M). The energy composite is made up of the outputs
of the energy industries. The materials consists of the outputs of the other non-energy industries. At
the top level, the materials composite is employed in fixed proportions with an aggregate of energy,
capital and labor. A constant elasticity describes the substitution possibilities between the energy
aggregate and the aggregate of labor and capital at the second level. Finally, at the third level capital
and labor trade off with a unitary elasticity of substitution. On the output side, production is split
between goods produced for the domestic market and goods produced for the world market according
to a constant elasticity of transformation. The resulting intra-period zero-profit condition for the
production of good i is:
                                                     
12 Decreasing returns are accommodated in the CRTS framework through introduction of a specific factor under the
assumption of perfect competition.
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where:
 i
x is the benchmark export value share in output of sector i,
Pi is the output price of good i,
Y
it is the net production (output) tax on good i,
DX
 is the elasticity of transformation between production for the domestic market and
production for the export market,
PXi is the export price of good i (expressed in domestic currency)13,

KLE
i is the benchmark value share of capital, labor and energy inputs (KLE aggregate) in
sector i,
E
i is the energy input value share of the KLE aggregate in sector i,
M
iP stands for the composite price of the materials composite input into sector i,
E
iP stands for the composite price of the energy composite input into sector i,
KLE
 is the elasticity of substitution between the energy aggregate and the aggregate of
capital and labor,
w is the economy-wide gross wage rate (net of payroll taxes),
L
it is the payroll tax rate in sector i,
r is the uniform rate of return on mobile capital (net of capital taxes),
K
it is the capital tax rate in sector i,
L
i denotes the value shares of labor in the value added of sector i,
and
Yi is the associated dual variable, which indicates the activity level of production in
sector i.
                                                     
13 The prices for exports PXi and imports PMi are expressed in domestic currency. Export prices iPX  and import prices
iPM  in international currency (e.g. in $US) are exogenous for the small open economy. The real exchange rate µ relates
international prices to domestic prices, i. e.  PM  PM ii  .
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Armington aggregation across imports and goods produced for the domestic market
Each of the individual inputs which make up the energy and the materials composite is a
composite of a domestic and an imported variety which trade off with a constant elasticity of
substitution. The corresponding zero-profit condition for the production of the Armington good i is
given by:
  0 =at  P )-(1 + )PM)t+((1  - P = COiCOi -1  IMiiIMi -1  IMi -1
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where:
A
iP is the Armington price of the composite good i,
 i
IM is the benchmark value share of imports in the Armington good i,
iPM is the import price of good i (expressed in domestic currency),
IM
it is the (ad-valorem) tariff rate on imported goods,
DM
 is the Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and imports,
2COt is the CO2 tax rate,
2CO
ia is the physical carbon emission coefficient for good i,
and
Ai is the associated dual variable, which indicates the activity level of Armington good
production.
Material composite
The material composite is produced in fixed proportions (Leontief):
0 

A
j
M
ji
EGj
M
i
M
i P- P = 
where:
M
ji is the benchmark value share of the non-energy Armington good j (jEG) in the
materials composite of sector i,
and
Mi is the associated dual variable, which indicates the activity level of production of the
materials composite for sector i.
Energy composite
As to the formation of the energy aggregate, we employ several levels of nesting to represent
differences in substitution possibilities between primary fossil fuel types as well as substitution
between the primary fossil fuel composite and secondary energy, i.e. electricity. In the bottom nest,
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liquid fuels (refined oil (OIL), crude oil (CRU), gas (GAS)) trade off with a constant elasticity of
substitution. At the same level, hard coal and soft coal are combined within a CES aggregate. The
liquid fuel composite and the coal composite enter the next level with a constant elasticity of
substitution. At the top level, the aggregate of non-electric energy combines with electricity at a
constant elasticity of substitution14:
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where:
E
iP is the price of the energy composite good for sector i,
 i
ELE is the benchmark value share of electricity in the energy aggregate of sector i,
ELE
 is the elasticity of substitution between electricity and non-electric (fossil)
energy,
 i
COA is the benchmark value share of coal inputs within the fossil fuel aggregate
input of sector i,
LQDCOA _
 is the elasticity of substitution between the coal composite and the liquid fuel
composite,
and
Ei is the associated dual variable, which indicates the activity level of production
of the energy composite for sector i.
Public output
Public goods and services are produced in fixed proportions (Leontief aggregation) of commodity
inputs which are composed as an Armington aggregate of domestic and imported commodities:
0 = P  - P = AiGi
i
GG

where:
GP is the composite price for government demand,
G
i is the benchmark value share of Armington input i in public goods provision,
and
G is the associated dual variable which indicates the activity level of public goods
provision.
                                                     
14 For the sake of brevity, we have a dropped the explicit representation of the lowest nest and employ instead an artificial
liquid fuel composite (price COAiP ) and coal aggregate (price 
LIQ
iP ).
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Consumer good production
Consumer goods are produced in fixed proportions of Armington goods (Z-Matrix transformation
with fixed coefficients):
0 = P   - P = Aiiz
i
z
Z
z 
where:
zP is the price for consumption good z (net of value-added taxes),
iz is the benchmark value share of producer good i into the formation of consumer good
z,
and
Zz is the associated dual variable which indicates the activity level of consumer good
production.
Non-leisure consumption composite
Substitution patterns within the aggregate of (non-leisure) consumption goods are described by a
Cobb-Douglas function. The zero-profit condition for the (non-leisure) consumption composite is
given by:
0)   )t+(1P(  - P = 
CG
zCG
zz
z
CGCG 
where:
CGP is the price for the (non-leisure) consumption composite (gross of value-added taxes),
CG
z is the benchmark value share of consumer commodity z in aggregate (non-leisure)
household consumption
CG
zt is the value-added tax rate on inputs of consumption goods into aggregate
consumption,
and
CG is the associated dual variable which indicates the activity level of household
consumption of commodities (excluding leisure).
Full consumption
Intra-period household demand is given as a separable nested CES function which describes
the trade-off between leisure and consumption. The zero-profit condition reads as:
0))1((
11 1
1




 	


 P)(1 + tw  - P = CGFwFCC
FF F

 
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where:
PC is the composite price index of aggregate leisure and goods consumption,
F
 is the benchmark value share of leisure in intra-period household consumption,
is the price of current leisure,
F
 is the elasticity of substitution between current leisure and commodity consumption
(calibrated consistently to a given supply elasticity of labor with respect to the real
wage),
wt is the labor income tax rate (applicable to the gross wage),
and
C is the associated dual variable which indicates the activity level of aggregate
household consumption (commodities and leisure).
Capital formation and investment
An efficient allocation of capital, i.e. investment over time assures the following intertemporal
zero-profit conditions which relates the cost of a unit of investment, the return to capital and the
purchase price of a unit of capital stock in period t 15:
0 p ) - (1  r  p 
K
1+t
K
t
K
t
K
t 
and
0  p P
K
1+t
A
it
I
i
i
I
t 
where:
pKt is the value (purchase price) of one unit of capital stock in period t,
 is the capital depreciation rate,
I
i is the benchmark value share of Armington input i in the homogeneous investment ´
good,
PAitIi
i
 is the cost of a unit of investment in period t
16,
and
Kt is the associated dual variable, which indicates the activity level of capital stock in
period t,
                                                     
15 The optimality conditions for capital stock formation and investment are directly derived from the maximization of lifetime
utility by the representative household taking into account its budget constraint, the equation of motion for the capital stock
and the condition that output in each period is either invested or consumed. Note that in our algebraic exposition we assume
an investment lag of one period.
16 The investment good is produced subject to a Leontief technology which combines Armington inputs in fixed proportions.
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It is the associated dual variable, which indicates the activity level of aggregate
investment in period t 17.
Market Clearance18
Domestic supply
Producer goods produced for the domestic market enter Armington production:
P 
  A  = 
tP 
 
Y 
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A
i
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ii
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i
i




))1((
Armington supply
Armington goods enter intermediate demand for the production of producer goods and consumer
goods as well as government and investment demand:
A
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Intermediate energy supply
The sector-specific intermediate energy composite enters production:
E
i
Y  
i
i
i
i P 
  Y  = E



Intermediate material supply
The sector-specific intermediate material composite enters production:
M
i
Y  
i
i
i
i P 
  Y  = M



Consumer goods supply
Consumer goods enter final consumption demand:
))1(( Czz
CG 
z tP 
 CG   = Z


Non-leisure consumption
Non-leisure consumption enters the aggregate consumption (including leisure):
P 
  C  = CG
CG
C 


                                                     
17 As written, we have taken explicit account of the non-negativity constraint for investment.
18 We exploit Shepard's Lemma to provide a compact representation of compensated demand and supply functions.
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Government provision
Public good provision increases at the exogenous (steady-state) growth rate of the economy:
)1(1 grG = G tt 
where:
gr is the exogenous growth rate, and
0G is the base year level of public good provision.
Imports
The supply-demand balance for imported goods is:
))1(( IMii
A
i
ii tPM 
  A = IM


where:
IMi is the level of imports of good i.
Exports
The supply-demand balance for exported goods is:
))1(( Yii
Y
i
ii tPX 
  Y = EX


where:
EXi is the level of exports of good i.
Foreign closure
As to the trade balance with respect to the rest of the world a simple foreign closure rule is used:
In the small open economy framework, CIF import prices and FOB export prices are exogenous and
unaffected by the level of imports and exports. An intertemporal balance of payments constraint (trade
closure) assures no change in net indebtedness over the model horizon19:
EX PX   = IMPM  itit
i
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
Labor
The intra-period supply-demand balance for labor is written:
)1())1(( Li
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where:
                                                     
19 N.B.: In this framework, international flows of capital goods (borrowing and lending) are endogenous.
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E is the total endowment with time which grows at the exogenous (steady-state) rate gr
of the economy,20 and
F is the demand for leisure.
Capital
The supply-demand balance for capital services is written:
))1( Ki
Y
i
i
i t(r 
  Y  =rK



where:
K is the aggregate capital stock for domestic production.
Current period's investment augments the capital stock in the next period.21 Capital stocks are
updated as an intermediate calculation between periods.22 The stock-flow accounting relationship for
capital (equation of motion for the capital stock) can be written as:
I + K) - (1 = K tt1+t 
Income Balances
Household
The representative household chooses to allocate lifetime income across consumption in different
time periods:
ttttt
w
ttTT
TRKrFEtCP
FCFCFCFC 



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1=t
T
1=t
1
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2211
 + + Kp + )-)(1(w  =    
 .t.s
),u(   = )),u( ),...,,u( ),,u(  U(max 
where:

t is the pure rate of time preference which determines the intertemporal allocation of
consumption, and
                                                     
20 We represent growth in terms of Harrod-neutral technological progress in producing labor or leisure services per unit of
actual time (efficiency growth).
21 Capital accumulation (i. e. the level of savings and investment) is determined by firms managers who allocate investment
across sectors to maximize the present value of firms.
22 In our simulations, we assume that the capital stock is augmented by new investment with a three-year and depreciated at a
constant geometric rate.
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TR is an exogenous lump-sum transfer between the government and the household.23
For the intra-period utility function we assume the functional form 
F C
1 = )F,Cu( -1
tt
tt

 which is
consistent with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to 0.5.
Government
Government income consists of tax revenues from the representative household, which assures a
balanced budget (fiscal closure). The intertemporal income balance of the government is given by (for
the sake of brevity we omit production taxes and tariffs):
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Terminal Constraint
The finite horizon poses some problems with respect to capital accumulation. Without any
terminal constraint, the capital stock at the end of the model's horizon would have no value and this
would have significant repercussions for investment rates in the periods leading up to the end of the
model horizon. In order to correct for this effect we define a terminal constraint which forces terminal
investment to increase in proportion to final consumption demand:
11 

T
T
T
T
C 
C 
I 
I  .
                                                     
23 In our simulations with unemployment, TR includes both, exogenous transfers as well as endogenous unemployment
payments.
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B.  Unemployment
We introduce unemployment through the specification of a wage curve, which postulates a
negative relationship between the real wage rate (note that w below reflects the after-tax nominal
wage, which corresponds to w (1-tw) in our previous description) and the rate of unemployment ur:
 urg
P
w
CG  with 0g ,
where:
P is the consumer goods price index (in our case PCG)
and
ur is the unemployment rate.
This type of wage curve can be derived from trade union wage models as well as from efficiency
wage models (see e. g. Beißinger, 1996 or Hutton and Ruocco, 1999). Figure 1 illustrates the wage
curve in the traditional labor market diagram. The real wage rate w/P is measured on the vertical axis
and the labor supplied and demanded are measured on the horizontal axis.
real
wage
wage
curve
labor
unemployment
Figure 6: Wage curve and unemployment
Full employment occurs with the real wage rate of (w/P)0 at the intersection of the (inverse) labor
demand function L and the labor supply function LS. The wage curve now replaces the labor supply
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curve. Consequently, the equilibrium wage rate (w/P)1 lies above the market clearing wage rate. This
causes unemployment at an amount of    11 LLS  .
Our initial labor market clearance condition then becomes:
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In our calculations, we assume that the unemployment benefit payments are constant in real terms
and are not taxed. We can write the wage curve as a log-linear function:
 ur
P
w loglog 10  





where:
 0 is a positive scale parameter which includes the real unemployment benefits, and
1 < 0 is the elasticity of the real wage with respect to the unemployment rate.
